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Villarreal: The Admissibility of Evidence Obtained from an Automobile

NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Admissibility of Evidence Obtained from an Automobile
Since it is well established that automobiles come within the purview
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,1 it is therefore, essential that before material, tools, or contraband are admitted in
evidence against the driver, owner, one in possession and control, or
one who has consented to a warrantless search, the state first establishes
that the seizure was a result of a reasonable search. It is imperative that
the reasonableness of the search be established because "unreasonable
searches and seizures" are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. As an
aid in determining what is reasonable, the courts have developed and
established six major tests by which the reasonableness of a warrantless
search is measured. First, the search must have been "reasonable" in
its generic perspective. 2 Second, it must have been "incident to a lawful
arrest."3 Third. the search must have been "contemporaneous to a lawful
arrest."4 Fourth, the search must have been made upon "probable cause.'' 5
Fifth, the evidence seized must have been within "plain view" of the officer.' Sixth, the evidence is admissible if it was seized after the defendant willfully, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily consented to
a warrantless search.7 Thus, if the search was made within any of these
tests, it is deemed not to have been unreasonable and, therefore, the objects seized are admissible in evidence against the defendant and dispenses
with the need of a search warrant.
REASONABLENESS

The inherent and generic peculiarity of the facts of a given case is another factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the
search. Thus, what will be a reasonable search in one case may be unreasonable in another. For example, where defendants were caught "redhanded" passing counterfeit money and subsequently arrested in their
' Edwards v. State, 83 Okla. Crim. 340, 177 P.2d 143 (1947) ; Henry v. United
States,
361 U.S. 98 (1959); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
See section on Reasonableness, infra.
See section on Contemporaneous and Incident to the arrest.
4Id.
o

See section on Probable Course, infra.
See section on Plain View, infra.
See section on Consent, infra.
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car, which was removed to the police station where a warrantless search
was conducted, the counterfeit money was admitted into evidence8 because the search was reasonable. The given rationale for making the
search reasonable is that the defendants had been caught passing counterfeit money; that they had been under surveillance as suspects of a rumored bank robbery attempt and of the possibility that the car might
contain dangerous weapons.
It should be noted that this alone should not dispense with the need
to obtain a search warrant, for once defendants are arrested, in custody,
or in jail it will not be likely that they will destroy or remove the "dangerous weapons."'" In addition, the court contends that since the car
was subject to forfeiture the search that followed was reasonable. Again,
it should be noted that "while the car is subject to forfeiture," the owner
continues to have title and an interest in the automobile and its contents
"until determined forfeited."
The most valid part of the decision seems to be that the right to
make a warrantless search includes a contemporaneous search made pursuant to a lawful arrest which extends to things over which the defendant may have control." Here, the car belonged to the defendant,
and had the officer's and defendant's cars not been blocking traffic for
half a mile, defendant's car would have been searched at the scene of
the arrest. Thus, the removal of the car to the police station, which was
a mile and a half away, was not only reasonable, but necessary. Therefore, this makes the search a reasonable one, for it was incident to the
arrest. The moving of the scene of the arrest to a safer site does not
make the search unreasonable.
On the other hand, the lawful custody of a vehicle does not in itself
dispense with the reasonableness of the search. It is the reason for and
the nature of the custody that may constitutionally justify the search. 2
Where a car is impounded for being used in trafficking narcotics, and
by statute is to be held as evidence until a forfeiture is declared or a release ordered, a search a week after the accused's arrest is reasonable
for the search was closely related to the reason defendant was arrested
and the reason for which his car was impounded.' This rule seems to
'United States v. C. L. Powell, 407 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1969).
'United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
10 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
" United States v. Powell, 407 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1969).
1 Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
1

" Id.
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say that where the police validly hold an automobile in accordance to a
state statute, the search is reasonable if conducted in pursuance to the
reason for which it was impounded. Since reasonableness is the test, it
dispenses with the argument that a search warrant should have been
procured for a search made a week after defendant's arrest.
However, a search is not reasonable where the police lack authority
to hold a vehicle and a warrantless search produces evidence with which
an entirely different offense could have been committed than the one for
which the accused was arrested and placed in custody. Thus, when the
offenses for which defendant was arrested and the car searched are different and not related, the search lacks the nexus which might have made
it constitutionally reasonable. 4
For example, where defendant was arrested in his car for vagrancy
and the car was not searched at the time of the arrest, but was searched
after defendant had been arrested and was in custody and the car had
been stored in a garage, the evidence seized was not admitted to convict
him of conspiring to rob a bank. Because once the accused is in custody,
a warrantless search at another place is simply not incident nor contemporaneous to the arrest; thus, it is unreasonable and bars the evidence
seized from being admitted.1 5
The prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment must be construed to
protect and conserve the rights and interests of the individual ;16 thus, the
police can not, without violating the Fourth Amendment, search for the
sole purpose of obtaining evidence to arrest and convict. 7 It is well established that an unlawful search can not be justified by what is found and
that a search that is unlawful ab ibnitio is unlawful when it ends and is
not made lawful by the discovery of evidence which is illegal to possess.
This type of prying and searching is clearly what the constitution intends
to prohibit. 8
Although, "a search incident to a lawful arrest" connotes a search
in the immediate place of arrest and a "search contemporaneous to the
arrest" implies conducting a search within reasonable time of the arrest,
at times they are applied interchangeably. For example, where an automobile was searched some one hundred yards from the arrest for store" Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); United States v. Coin;
United States v. Condy, 332 F.2d 999 (6th Cir. 1964).
'

Id.

',

Carroll et al. v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
State v. Doyle, 42 N.J. 334, 200 A.2d 606 (1964).
United States v. Slusser, 270 F.2d 818 (S.D. Ohio 1921).
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breaking, the court held that it was sufficiently contemporaneous and incident to the arrest.' 9 However, where one is arrested while in the car,
and a search incident to his arrest is commenced and subsequently the
suspect is taken away, the evidence that was obtained from the search
that continued is admissible because the search is sufficiently contemporaneous with the arrest. It should be noted that the evidence was admitted, notwithstanding the fact that the accused was removed from the
scene of the arrest while the search had not been completed, but while it
was in progress.2" Note that here the contemporaneous test is used to
emphasize time, where above, it was used to stress distance.
The fact that Preston v. United States holds that a warrantless search
is not permitted when the accused is in custody and the search is conducted at a different place from where he was arrested does not prohibit
a search that is incident or contemporaneous to a lawful arrest. This is
not so, even where the defendant is placed under arrest and has handed
21
the car keys to the officer.
The rationale for admitting evidence which was obtained from a
warrantless search but made incident or contemporaneous to the arrest
is that weapons may be used to assault an officer, to escape,22 or to
destroy the fruits of the crime, or tools and equipment used in commiting the crime.2 3 Since the incident and contemporaneous tests are so interrelated with the remaining tests, further treatment will be accorded
them in the following material.
PROBABLE CAUSE

As stated above, evidence obtained by a warrantless search is admissible if it was made incident or contemporaneous to a lawful arrest
or if search was reasonable under a given set of circumstances. The principle of law to be developed here is that evidence is admissible if obtained by a warrantless search which was the fruit of an arrest or search
based on probable cause.24 Conversely stated, it is illegal to make an arrest
"9State v. K. R. Shedd; State v. J. L. Shedd, 274 N.C. 95, 161 S.E.2d 477
(1968).
"0United States v. Trotta; United States v. Genovese, 401 F.2d 514 (4th Cir.
1968) ; Crawford v. Bannon, 336 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1964).
21 Adams v. United States, 336 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Sisk v. Lane,
331 F.2d 235 (7th Cir. 1964).
"Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
23 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
United States v. Haith, 297
2 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959);
F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1961) ; Carroll v. United States, 276 U.S. 132 (1925).
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or a search without having probable cause; consequently the evidence
obtained from such a search is not admissible2 5 for the search is deemed
unreasonable.
The probable cause test is determined by whether the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge were sufficient in themselves to
lead a reasonable man to believe that a vehicle contained contraband.Y'
This is not to say that an officer may not "rely" on an informant's information. He may, as long as it is reasonably corroborated by facts of
which the officer has knowledge.2I On the other hand, while the officer
may "rely" on an informant's information so long as the information
is corroborated with facts of which the officer has knowledge, he may
not "act" without such corroboration.
Therefore, the police can not search a car in response to an informer's
information given over the phone.2 ' The search must be based on what
the officer believed 29 as a result of what he heard and saw," ° unless the
informer was a reliable source.
However, in United States v. Callahan once the officer learned that
the license plates had been issued to a different vehicle, he had probable
cause to believe that the car had been stolen. This justifies the search on
probable cause.3
In this case, an independent reason existed to justify the search.
The officer, with the aid of a flashlight, saw molds for United States coins
through the car window. Their seizure was held not a product of a
search, for to observe or to notice what is in "plain view" of the officer
does not constitute a search.8 2 This rule applies whether the observation
was made in day light or in artificial light.3 3
Once having seized the mold which was in plain view, the officer had
probable cause to arrest defendants for transporting counterfeit molds of
United States coins. Defendant having been arrested on probable cause,
the search and seizure of the rest of the molds are admissible in evidence,
for the search was made incident to a lawful arrest which was made
" Bowling v. United States, 350 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
" United States v. Walker, 307 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1962).
" Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) ; Carroll et al. v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
" United States v. Callahan, 256 F. Supp. 739 (1964).
" Carroll et al. v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
OScher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
"United

States v. Callahan, 256 F. Supp. 739 (1964).

Trujillo v. United States, 294 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1961).
"United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); United States v. Williams, 314
F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1963).
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upon probable cause; for the officer had knowledge of the molds at or
prior to the time of arrest and seizure. 4 The thrust of this rule is that
contraband in plain view gives rise to probable cause and thus justifies
the subsequent arrest or search.
In instances in which the circumstances indicate probable cause' 5
that a crime is being committed or is about to be committed, 3 6 officers
37
have the right to stop, detain, frisk, and arrest and search the suspect
and his car3 8 if the officer has reason to believe that he is dangerous 39 or
that his car contains contraband.
But "mere suspicion alone" does not constitute probable cause to
arrest, detain, or search. Therefore, a search based on "suspicion only"
is unreasonable and the evidence seized is not admissible.4" Thus, where
an officer stopped a motorist who had not been suspected of any criminal
activity at or prior to the time of detention or arrest, but had been stopped
merely on the basis that the officers had seen him take packages from a
neighborhood residence, the contraband found in the packages was not
admissible in evidence for the search nor the arrest had been made upon
probable cause nor could the discovery of the contraband justify the
search. 4 ' The fact that the car is a moveable vehicle and can easily be
taken out of the jurisdiction, that alone, does not dispense with the need
of probable cause before it is searched.4"
PLAIN VIEW

A search connotates "probing into hidden places for what may be
concealed"4 and requires some sort of force, whether the force is actual,
constructive, much or little ;44 or at least a "forcible dispossession of the
"United States v. Callahan, 256 F. Supp. 739 (1964); Armada v. United
States, 319 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1963).
" Petteway v. United States, 261 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1958).
" United States v. Haith, 297 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1961).
" State v. Moore; State v. Willin, 55 Del. 356, 187 A.2d 807 (1963).
"RCarroll et al. v. United States, 276 U.S. 132 (1925); Agnello v. United

States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
" Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13, 98 P. 43 (1908).
"Bowling v. United States, 350 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
1 State v. Doyle, 42 N.J. 334, 200 A.2d 606 (1964) ; United States v. Slusser,
270 F.2d 818 (S.D. Ohio 1921).
' 2 Henry v. United tates, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
204, 47 N.E.2d 56 (1943).
People v. Exum, 382 Ill.
"Cornbest v. State, 32 Okla. Crim. 47, 239 P. 936 (1925) ; State v. Morris and
Williams, 243 S.C. 225, 133 S.E.2d 744 (1963).
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property of the owner by an officer's exploratory acts." 45 The Fourth
Amendment prohibits the admissibility of evidence obtained from "unreasonable searches and seizures" but does not prohibit the admissibility
of evidence which is not fruit of a search. Therefore, contraband seized
which was in plain view of an officer, while discharging his official duties,
is admissible in evidence because to notice that which is in plain view
is not a search. 6 This rule is controlling, whether that which was ob47
served was in daylight or with the aid of artificial light-flashlight.
Where the arresting officer, while examining the driver's license of
the defendant, noticed a stolen check book and check protector lying in
plain view on the car seat, 48 or where non-tax-paid liquor and a pistol
lay in a car exposed to plain view, 49 or where stolen clothes were seen in
the back seat while warning the driver that a certain turn was dangerous
and hazardous,5" these articles and contraband were admitted in evidence
for seizure of that which is in plain view is not unreasonable since it is not
fruit of a search. 5'
Notice that these seizures-seizing of that which is in plain viewwould have given rise to probable cause and justified the searching of
other parts of the vehicle, or if defendants had been arrested for possession of the contraband, a further search would have been permissible as
52
a search incident to a lawful arrest.
To convict the defendant of bank robbery, the court admitted in evidence bundles of currency which were in the back seat and were seen and
seized by the arresting officer while rolling up the windows of the defendant's car to protect it from the rain. The money was admitted in evidence, for to see what is patent and obvious does not constitute a search.53
Certainly the officers are not required or expected to perform their duties
with their eyes closed. The same rule is applied to the instance in which
"Kelly v. State, 39 Ala. App. 572, 195 So. 2d 687 (1958); Crowell v. State,
14 Tex. Crim. 299, 180 S.W.2d 343 (1944).
" State v. D. E. Howard; State v. J. Howard, 274 N.C. 186, 162 S.E.2d 495
(1968); People v. Cattaneo, 6 Ill. 2d 122, 126 N.E.2d 692 (1955).
"United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); United States v. Williams, 314
F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1963).
" People v. Shocky, 67 Ill. App. 133, 213 N.E.2d 573 (1966).
, McSheriden v. State, 43 Al. A. 239, 187 So. 2d 294 (1966); State v. N. Giles,
254 N.C. 499, 119 S.E.2d 394 (1961).
9 State v. Griffin, 84 N.J. 508, 202 A.2d 856 (1964).
"Id.
"People v. Cattaneo, 6 Ill. 2d 122, 126, N.E.2d 692 (1955).
"Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1965); Price v. United
States, 348 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1957).
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the immigration patrol, while checking occupant's citizenship, noticed
defendant trying to conceal boxes containing marijuana."
CONSENT

The Fourth Amendment, which secures an individual's person, his
home, his papers and property, including his automobile, from "unreasonable searches and seizures"55 is one of the most important cornerstones
of the American judicial process. A person, nonetheless, has an inherent
right to waive his constitutional rights, if he voluntarily,50 knowingly
and intelligently,57 unequivocally and specifically 58 gives officers consent
to search; provided the search is free from any duress or coercion, actual
or implied.59 In addition, the person must be cognizant of his rights
in the vehicle,60 before he can intelligently waive them. Certainly, one
can not intelligently surrender a right which he is not aware that he
has.61
The requirement of knowledge of one's rights is to prevent the possibility that the ignorant may surrender his rights which he has an inherent right to enjoy. The defendant, then, must be warned of his
right to refuse a warrantless search. Notice of defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights is just as important and necessary as the notice required by Mirandav. Arizona in regard to the Fifth Amendment right of
right to counsel."2 Thus, materials obtained from a warrantless search will
not be admitted in evidence in absence of evidence that defendant was
warned or that he was aware of his right to refuse a search without a warrant. 3 However, once it is established that a person consented to a warrantless search, his constitutional right is deemed waived and he may not
thereafter complain of the search.6 4
In testing to determine whether the accused has waived his Fourth
Amendment rights, it is deemed that one has not voluntarily consented,
if he has denied his guilt and assured the police that he has nothing to
" Haerr v. United States, 240 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1957).
" Edwards v. State, 83 Okla. Crim. 340, 177 P.2d 143 (1947).
6 Wren v. United States, 352 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1965).
" United States v. Balalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (1966).
" United States v. Thompson, 356 F. 2d 216 (2d Cir. 1965).
"'United States v. Vickers, 387 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1967).
"Wren v. United States, 352 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1965); McDonald v. United
States, 307 F.2d 272 (10th Cir. 1962) ; United States v. Balalock, 255 F. Supp. 268
(1966).
" United States v. Balalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (1966).
2Id.
"Id.

"State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968).
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hide and that they will not find anything, even though he subsequently
encourages the policeman to search. The rationale is that no sane
person who has denied his guilt would actually consent to a search which
offers a certain chance that contraband will be found.6" But, consent is
given if the person admits his guilt, instead of denying it and permits the
search without a warrant.6 6 Note that a person voluntarily giving his
consent does not have to have an affirmative desire for the search to be
conducted. 7 On the other hand, if the person allows a warrantless search
in a mistaken belief that he does not have anything which will incriminate
him, and the officers do find incriminating evidence, consent is judged
to have been given and the evidence is admissible.68 In such a case, it
would be hard to find clearer evidence of a person giving his consent
voluntarily.69 The same is true where one consents in hope that the officers are in a routine check and will move on, or where one consents in
the belief that the officers have caught him and that it is to his advantage
and interest to cooperate with them. 0 Consent is also deemed given where
defendant consented to the search, but did not anticipate that the police71
men would examine behind the car door's upholstery.
To determine whether any coercion was applied, the court will scrutinize the circumstances, not merely the words, under which consent allegedly was given and will weigh the presumption against waiver and
72

consent.

Thus, alleged consent while defendant is in custody or in jail is not
a voluntary consent. Because once in jail, there is hardly anything else
the defendant could have said.7 ' Likewise, exhaustive questioning or persistent demands constitute coercion, thus, the defendant is deemed not to
have given his consent. However, the presence of an officer, with all his
police paraphernalia alone, but absent any coercive words or acts does not
amount to coercion.7 4 But, where the officer displays his badge and says,
" Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Higgins v. United
States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
United States v. Vickers, 387 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1967).
, United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1949).
"8United States v. De Vino, 190 F. Supp. 483 (1961); Higgins v. United

States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
570 United
States v.
v. Thompson,
Simpson, 353
United States
356F.2d
F.2d 530
216 (2d
(2d Cir.
Cir. 1965).
1965).
1 Grice v. United States, 146 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1945).
Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1963).
Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951); United States v.
Novero, 58 F. Supp. 275 (1944).
"'United States v. Thompson, 356 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v.
Como, 240 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1965).
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"I am here to search," and in response defendant says, "All right, go
ahead," the display of the badge and the officer's declaration constitute
coercion and the defendant has not voluntarily consented.75 Also, where
consent is accorded to a show of arms as where patrolmen with drawn
pistol and a riot gun order the occupants of an automobile to get out and
arrested them, the alleged consent is not regarded as voluntary.76
A person is deemed to have voluntarily consented when permission
to search is given in response to a threat to procure a search warrant,"
but this is not so where the threat to get a search warrant is accompanied
with the threat to impound the car. 7 s The same result arises where the
officers announce that they have a search warrant, when in fact they
79
do not have a warrant at all or the warrant proves not to be valid.
Consent may also be given by the person's conduct. Where defendant
has volunteered to open the trunk of his automobile, such conduct constitutes an invitation to search and he can not afterwards complain of an
unreasonable search when the contraband is admitted in evidence.8"
The rule here, then, is that if a person consents to a search, he waives
his right to complain that the search is unreasonable as prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment, and the evidence is admissible against him.
WHO MAY OBJECT

The Fourth Amendment grants a personal privilege and an individual's right against unreasonable search only to the person whose rights
have been encroached upon." However, before a search and seizure is
rendered unreasonable, defendant must assert proprietory or possessory
interest in that which was searched and seized and sought to be introduced into evidence against him."2
A passenger in an automobile may not invoke the amendment that
"'United States v. Slusser, 270 F. 818 (S.D. Ohio 1921).

" Weed v. United States, 340 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v.
Marquette et al. 271 F. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1920).
" Gotterdam v. United States, 5 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1925); United States v.
Baldocci, 42 F.2d 567 (S.C. Cal. 1930); Hamilton v. North Carolina, 260 F. Supp.
632 (1966).
"'Weed v. United States, 340 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1965); Graham v. State,
86 Okla. Crim. 9, 184 P.2d 984 (1947).
"Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Meno v. State, 197 Ind.
16, 164 N.E. 93 (1925).
" State v. C. Miller, 246 N.C. 608, 99 S.E.2d 795 (1957); State v. Grace
Brown; State v. C. E. Jones, 247 N.C. 539, 101 S.E.2d 418 (1958).
"' State v. McPeak; Cordell and Campbell, 243 N.C. 243, 90 S.E.2d 501 (1955);
State v.Hamilton, 264 N.C. 277, 141 S.E.2d 506 (1965).
" Baskerville v.United States, 227 F.2d 454 (10th Cir. 1955).
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RIGHT TO RESIST AN UNLAWFUL ARREST
the search was unreasonable, where the owner of the vehicle has consented to the search.13 But, a person has grounds to complain, where he
is not the driver, but is in possession and has the right of control of the
vehicle."4 Likewise, a lessee of a car who is in possession of the vehicle
has standing to object to an unreasonable search because he has a legal
possessory interest which is protected by the Fourth Amendment.85 But
one who hires another to chauffeur him around town-taxi cab situation-has no right to object because the right of possession and control
remains in the driver of the car.86 On the other hand a bailee has standing to object to the introduction of evidence obtained from an unreason87
able warrant because of his possessory interest.
One who disclaims ownership or possession of what is being sought
to be introduced in evidence, has no right to object because the constitutional protection is only extended to those who have a proprietory or
possessory interest in the property. 8 A thief, then, has no legal possession or legal interest in a stolen car; thus, he has no constitutional standing to object to the methods of seizure nor to the introduction of the evidence seized.89
D. L. VILLARREAL

The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest Amended
The increased conflict between police and citizenry today, and the cry

for law and order, make the question of individual rights crucial. Decisions governing police practices and the rights of the arrested individual
have generally increased personal protections. But the common law right
to resist an unlawful arrest is now being scrutinized and chiseled away.
It is curious that a right that has been firmly established for over three
hundred years is waning.
"8State v. McPeak, Cordell and Campbell, 243 N.C. 283, 158 S.E.2d 511 (1968).
v. J. Bishop, 272 N.C. 283, 158 S.E.2d 511 (1968).

8" State

" Weed v. United States, 340 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1965).
" State v. Sylvester Dawson, 262 N.C. 607, 138 S.E.2d 234 (1964).

" United
States v. Eldrige, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962).
Baskerville v. United States, 227 F.2d 454 (10th Cir.

1955); Wilson v.
United States, 218 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1955); People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 47
N.E.2d 56 (1943).
8 Williams v. United States, 323 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1963).
88
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